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Abstract 
Although the federal funds rate started rising from mid-2004 US long term rates 
continued to fall. A likely contributory factor to this conundrum was the 
contemporaneous increase in US bond demand. Using ARDL-based models, 
which accommodate structural breaks, this paper estimates the impact of demand 
on US bond yields in the conundrum period. This impact is shown to have been 
everywhere significantly negative. The fact that our model fully explains the bond 
yield conundrum gives support to the hypothesis that the US CDO market was 
rapidly expanded before 2007 chiefly to absorb the overspill of global demand for 
safe assets. 
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From 2002 to mid-2007 when the US subprime crisis broke out US bond yields 
were at unusually low levels. Before mid-2004 these levels could be explained by 
the greater stability of ‘fundamentals’ and low short term interest rates (the ‘great 
moderation’), but the persistence of these low yields after that point in time was 
puzzling. Financial markets expected long term rates to rise in tandem with the 
rise in the federal funds rate as was the case in previous periods of monetary 
tightening. This did not happen. On the contrary, not only did long term rates not 
rise they actually continued to fall1 (see Figure 1). As Alan Greenspan, the then 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated before Congress in June 2005: “Among 
the biggest surprises of the past year has been the pronounced decline in long-
term interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities despite a 2-percentage-point 
increase in the federal funds rate. This is clearly without recent precedent. … 
Moreover, even after the recent backup in credit risk spreads, yields for … 
corporate bonds have declined even more than Treasuries over the same period.” 
(Greenspan 2005, p.1).  
What caused this ‘bond yield conundrum’? Considering that its appearance 
coincided with a marked upswing in investor demand for US bonds (see Figure 2) 
it is possible that a considerable part of the downward pressure on US bond yields 
stemmed from that demand (Bernanke et al. 2011). To verify this possibility, a 
number of empirical studies have focused specifically on the impact of foreign 
government demand for US Treasuries on long term Treasury yields. Foreign 
official investor demand began to increase after February 1994 when China 
devalued its currency, but the rate of increase in that demand accelerated even 
more sharply after 2003 as many emerging market economy governments sought 
to preserve part of their increasing commodity revenues and export surpluses in 
 
1
 In June 2005 the long term rate was 73 basis points lower than it was one year before. In December 2006 the rate was 
still slightly lower, although the federal fund rate was 425 basis points higher than it was 2 ½ years earlier and expected to 
stay relatively stable above the  4% level until 2015 (Kozicki and Sellon 2005). 
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safe stores of value. While some studies found no evidence of a long term demand 
impact on Treasury yields (e.g. ECB 2006; Rudebusch et al. 2006), the majority 
of recent studies have found evidence of a negative impact, albeit that the 
estimated size of the impact varied from study to study (e.g. Idier et al. 2007; 
Bandholz et al. 2009; Craine and Martin 2009; Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 
2009). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. LONG AND SHORT TERM INTEREST RATES IN THE US 
Notes: The top plot compares the 3-month Eurodollar rate with the 10-year Treasury yield. The bottom plot demonstrates 
the downward movement of traditional long-term bond yields in the US (Source: Bloomberg 2010, FR Statistical Release 
H.15 2010). 
 
In this paper we assess the impact of investor demand on long term Treasury 
yields using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based econometric model. 
Since it has become well established that the increase in demand for US bonds 
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stemmed not only from foreign official investors but also from private foreign 
(mainly European) and domestic investors (Bernanke et al. 2011) we consider the 
impact of all of these sources of demands on yields. Further, given that the bond 
yield conundrum applied as much to the other major US bond markets as to the 
Treasury market, one would have expected an analysis of the impact of demand 
on long term yields in these other markets. As there has been no such analysis2, 
this paper seeks to fill this gap by modeling the impact of investor demand on US 
agency, and AAA-rated corporate and municipal bond yields using ARDL-based 
models. 
In our view, an important by-product of this econometric assessment of the 
contribution of demand to the US bond yield conundrum is that it may help to 
resolve the question as to why the US collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 
market was allowed to grow in a very short time to a size that was able to trigger 
widespread financial panic when this market suddenly collapsed in August 2007. 
The conventional answer to this question is one that places the major burden of 
responsibility on the US financial system itself. However, there is a minority view 
that, while the US banks and their associates cannot be absolved from blame in 
accelerating the rate of production of CDOs right up to mid-2007, the major 
driving force behind that acceleration was the pressure of demand for US safe 
assets spilling over from other major US debt security markets (e.g. Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy 2009; Gros 2009; Lysandrou 2009; Caballero 2010). Clearly, this 
alternative view, and its ensuing policy implications, would command far more 
attention were it to be convincingly demonstrated that the rise in foreign and 
 
2
 To our knowledge nearly all existing studies on the conundrum concentrate on the demand from foreign official 
sources on long term Treasury yields. Exceptions in this regard are: ECB (2006) who test the impact of foreign official 
purchases on corporate bond yields and agency bond yields (without presenting their models in detail), Xiao and Xiao 
(2009) who test for the impact of pension funds on the yields of Treasuries and investment grade corporate bonds (without 
accounting for the demand from foreign sources and other domestic private investors), and Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 
(2009) who test if the increase in Treasury purchases from foreign sources had a negative effect on the yield of corporate 
bonds and mortgage rates. 
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domestic demand for US bonds in the period leading up to the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis did indeed have a substantial significant negative impact on all 
highly rated traditional fixed income products. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. US BOND HOLDINGS FROM FOREIGN AND PRIVATE DOMESTIC INVESTORS  
Notes: The plots show the US bond holdings of foreign governments (top), foreign private investors (middle) and domestic 
private investors (bottom), respectively (Source: FR Statistical Release Z.1 2010, Treasury International Capital System 
2010). 
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The layout of this paper is as follows. Section one gives details of model 
specification, the data used and the chosen sample period. Section two presents 
and discusses the estimation results while section three briefly comments on their 
policy implications. Section four concludes. 
I. Model specification and model selection 
A. Rationale for the models 
Any attempt to quantify the impact of demand on bond yields has to begin with 
a specification of all of the major determinants of yields. According to recent 
research (see e.g. Rudebusch et al. 2006; Wu 2008) these determinants broadly 
divide into two groups, those relating to macroeconomic essentials on the one 
hand and those relating to financial risk on the other. Apart from the short term 
interest rate, which is usually expected to influence nominal long term yields, 
inflation and the business cycle are also believed to be important determinants of 
these yields (see e.g. Bandholz et al. 2009; Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 2009).  
Changes in actual inflation can influence expectations about the real value of 
future coupon payments, the future federal funds rate and long term inflation 
rates, while changes in long term inflation expectations influence expectations 
about future short term interest rates and the real par value at maturity. Growth 
expectations possibly influence long term interest rates because in a boom market 
participants often expect inflationary pressure and a rise in the federal funds rate 
to prevent an overheating of the economy and thus request higher yields, and vice 
versa. As stated, beyond these macroeconomic indicators changes in default risk 
and volatility can also influence the long term yield (see e.g. Rudebusch et al. 
2006). A decrease in the volatility of bond yields, for example, decreases the risk 
for market participants and thus is expected to lower the yield. 
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The inclusion of bond demand as a possible determinant of bond yields is not 
uncontroversial. Investor demand should have no impact on yields in a world 
where financial markets are frictionless and all assets classes are perfect 
substitutes (ECB 2006). However, we shall consider the alternative position that 
financial markets are not frictionless and that bonds have certain distinct 
properties that enable them to meet investors’ needs in ways that other asset 
classes cannot (for a clear exposition of bond characteristics and their attraction 
for investors see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2007, and Greenwood and 
Vayanos 2010). In sum, our model can be represented by the following equation: 
(1)  = (, 	, 	
 , 
 , , ) 
 
where yl denotes the long term interest rate, is the short term interest rate, π current 
inflation, πe inflation expectations, ye growth expectations and rp is a risk 
premium for the expected default risk and macroeconomic and financial volatility, 
while d denotes investor demand for bonds. 
Given that most of these variables are non-stationary according to unreported 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests3 stationary vector autoregression 
(VAR) and vector error correction models (VECM) are preferable to a single 
equation ordinary least squares (OLS) specification to assess their impact on bond 
yields. However, existing macro-finance models of the term structure that use 
VAR and New Keynesian based modeling strategies (see Rudebusch et al. 2006, 
Eijffinger et al. 2010, Rudebusch 2010) have been criticized because of their no-
arbitrage assumption, the difficulty to optimize the likelihood function, the 
 
3
 Even though the ADF test has low power, inspection of data plots and knowledge of the data suggest that most of our 
variables are intrinsically I(1). Exceptions are the (log of the) ISM-Index, the MOVE Index, and the corporate bond 
holdings ratio from US individuals, which are stationary according to ADF tests. 
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overfitting of risk, and the implied homoskedastic yields (Eijffinger et al. 2010)4. 
Moreover, we find it impractical to apply the Johansen test for cointegration due 
to the large number of variables to be considered in the equilibrium and the large 
lag lengths required for monthly data (which make the degrees of freedom far too 
small). Consequently, we use four ARDL models in (unrestricted) error correction 
mechanism form to test which of the above stated determinants were mainly 
responsible for the low long term yields of AAA-rated US bonds. The general 
form of our models is: 
(2) ∆ =  + ∑ ∆ +⋯+ ∑ ∆ + ∑ ∆ +												∆ + ∑     + ! 
 
This modeling approach takes into account current and lagged differenced 
variables to measure short run effects and lagged level variables to account for 
long run effects, and it allows us to include all of the above stated determinants 
without losing too many degrees of freedom. Another important advantage of this 
modeling technique is that, in contrast to VECMs, it produces consistent estimates 
of the long run coefficients independently of their order of integration (Pesaran 
and Shin 1995)5. This is important in our application given that unit root tests 
suggest a mixture of I(1) and I(0) variables in our model. We apply Pesaran et 
al.’s (2001) bounds testing procedure (that corrects for weak endogeneity of 
regressors) to assess whether the variables in the models cointegrate. 
 
4 
To our knowledge macro-finance models of the term structure of interest rates were not able to solve the bond yield 
conundrum. For a discussion of macro-finance models of the term structure of interest rates see Diebold et al. (2005) and 
Rudebusch et al. (2006). See Kim (2007) for a thorough discussion of the shortcomings of this approach. 
5
 The ARDL form that we adopt has additional advantages. First, it possesses small sample power dominance in terms 
of testing cointegration over Engle and Granger type tests and, second, the model corrects for any weak endogeneity of 
regressors – see, for example, Shin et al. (2011). A further point is that we can simultaneously estimate and test structural 
breaks in both the long run and short run components of the ARDL model in a simple manner. 
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B. Data 
For each of the above listed determinants a proxy is chosen that is either the 
same as or similar to that used in previous studies. Considering that most of the 
relevant data is not available on a daily or weekly basis, monthly data are utilized 
to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom6. As proxies for US long term interest 
rates of highly rated fixed income securities we take the 10-year Treasury yield 
(retrieved from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15), the 10-year agency 
bond yield, and the average yield of Moody’s bond index for AAA-rated 
corporate bonds and for AAA-rated 10-year municipal bonds (all retrieved from 
Bloomberg). 
To account for changes in the US short term interest rate we include the 3-
month rate for Eurodollar deposits in London (Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
H.15). Following Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009), we see the Eurodollar 
rate as a preferable measure for changes in current monetary policy inasmuch as it 
varies more than the federal funds rate. As a proxy for current and expected 
inflation we include the trimmed personal consumption expenditure (PCE) 
deflator, following Bandholz et al. (2009), and the ten year consumer price index 
(CPI) inflation expectations, as in Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009) – data 
are taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Philadelphia Fed 
respectively. 
To capture the state of the business cycle, the purchasing manager index from 
the Manufacturing Survey of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) is used, 
as in Bandholz et al. (2009). This is because “[f]inancial market participants have 
anxiously anticipated the ISM ever since Alan Greenspan once claimed … that he 
 
6
 While monthly series do exist for most of the data some are only available on a quarterly basis and are therefore 
interpolated to monthly frequency with the “cubic match last” method, which is readily available in EViews. The variables 
which have been interpolated are: 10-year inflation expectations, domestic bond holdings, and the data on outstanding 
bonds (with the exception of Treasuries). The available data on the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio are only published twice 
each year by the CBO and are therefore also interpolated, in line with Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009). 
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placed great emphasis on this report” (Trainer (2006, p. 211)). When the ISM-
Index is relatively high (> 50) market participants expect high growth figures and 
when the ISM-Index is relatively low (< 43) a recession is anticipated. As a proxy 
for changes in the stock market – which is seen as a good indicator of the business 
cycle and for shifts in portfolio preferences (Idier et al. 2007) – we employ the 
Dow Jones Index (retrieved from yahoo finance). 
We use the following data to measure changes in default risk perceptions, 
financial market volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty. Default risk is 
captured by using data about expected fiscal policy, which is measured by 5-year-
ahead deficit-to-GDP expectations as in Laubach (2009)7 (retrieved from the CBO 
Budget and Economic Outlooks) and the expected default risk of AAA-rated 
corporate bonds. The latter is proxied by the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) 
for AAA-rated corporate bonds (kindly provided by Moody’s Analytics UK) as in 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007). Analogous to Rudebusch et al. 
(2006) data from the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index, 
retrieved from Bloomberg, are used to account for financial market volatility8. 
Furthermore, the 24-month rolling standard deviation of the Eurodollar rate, the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility (VIX) Index (retrieved from 
Bloomberg), and two measures for macroeconomic uncertainty (the 24-month 
rolling standard deviation of the ISM-Index and of the ten year CPI inflation 
expectations) are tested for significance, similar to Rudebusch et al. (2006). 
To measure the influence of changes in investor demand on bond yields, 
private and foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds are taken 
into account, as in Rudebusch et al. (2006) and Bandholz et al. (2009). The 
 
7
 It can be difficult to measure the impact of the actual deficit-to-GDP ratio because automatic stabilizers lead to an 
increase of deficit levels in recessionary periods, while monetary easing can at the same time be expected to lower the long 
term yield. Laubach (2009) has therefore proposed using expected deficit-to-GDP ratios as these are more likely to mirror 
investor’s expectations which are important in regard to long term yields. 
8
 For non-Treasury bonds the significance of the 24-month rolling standard deviations of changes in the long term 
yields are tested, similar to Warnock and Cacdac Warnock’s (2009) approach, but these proxies are insignificant. 
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holdings ratio is preferable to mere flow or stock figures because demand pressure 
can be expected to take place only when investors increase their holdings 
disproportionally to newly available bonds (i.e. if their holdings ratio increases). 
The data for changes in the holdings from US banking institutions, US individuals 
and US institutional investors are retrieved from the Flow of Funds statistics9. The 
data for foreign official and foreign private long term holdings are taken from the 
Treasury International Capital Reporting System (TIC)10 because the Flow of 
Fund statistics do not distinguish between official and private holdings. The 
amount of total outstanding bonds is retrieved from the Flow of Funds tables and 
from the Treasury Bulletins (outstanding notes, bonds and TIPS). 
C. Sample Period 
Most previous studies take the mid-1980s to mid-2000s as their sample period. 
In contrast, we limit our sample period to that spanning February 1994 to June 
2007 (with the exception of the agency bond model where the yield data are only 
available from 1995 onwards). February 1994 has been chosen as the starting 
point because the data on foreign official holdings show a structural break at that 
time – presumably the break can be attributed to the devaluation of the Renminbi 
from 5.8 ¥/$ to 8.7 ¥/$ between December 1993 and January 1994. Another 
reason is provided by Thornton (2007) who argues that the relationship between 
the federal funds rate and long term interest rates changed much earlier than in 
mid-2000 due to a change of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 
policies in 1988 towards using the federal funds rate as a policy target. Although 
he identifies 1988 as the break-point, he presents evidence that a structural break 
might also have occurred in 1994 when the FOMC started to release policy 
 
9
 Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Tables L209, L210, L211 and L212. 
10
 Holdings in the TIC data are only reported semi-annually. Therefore, estimations from the Fed about monthly 
changes in holdings are used. The source for these data is: http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2007/910/ticdata.zip. 
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statements after its meetings. This change has influenced expectations to a 
significant degree (Bernanke et al. 2004).  
D. Model selection 
Treasury yield model.—First, we model the 10-year Treasury yield based on 
the variables described above. Due to the multitude of potential variables that 
could be included, a model was constructed which incorporated contemporaneous 
differenced and level proxies of variables that were significant in the models of 
previous studies. Thus: 
(3) ∆ =  + (∆"#) + $(∆"%) + &(∆%) + '(∆)+((∆)*+) +,(∆	) + -(∆	) + .(∆/0) + 1(∆+/23)+(∆3() +4 5 + $("#) + &("%) + '(%)+(() +,()*+) + -(	) + .(	 ) + 1(/0)+$(+/23) +$(3( ) 
 
where t  indicates the current period, t-1 denotes a one month lag, ∆
 
is the 
difference operator, yl is the nominal 10-year Treasury yield, FO are foreign 
official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long term Treasuries, FP are 
foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long term Treasuries, P are 
US pension funds holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long term Treasuries, i is 
the 3-month Eurodollar rate, lism is the log of the ISM-Index, π is the actual PCE 
inflation rate, π10 are 10-year CPI inflation expectations, dow is the value of the 
Dow Jones Index, move is the MOVE Index, and def5 are 5-year deficit-to-GDP 
expectations. 
However, when estimated this model suffered from autocorrelation suggesting 
that the yield might be influenced by some differenced variables with a time lag. 
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The monthly frequency of our data suggests consideration of up to twelve lags of 
each of the variables. However, all twelve differences of all of the variables in (3) 
could not be included simultaneously. We therefore added the twelve lagged 
differences of just one variable in (3) and, based on an F-test, excluded the jointly 
insignificant lags of the differences of this variable. This was repeated in turn for 
each of the variables in (3), including the dependent variable, until a model that 
included only significant lags of the differences of all variables was obtained. 
Finally, all level variables which were not significant at the 5% level were 
removed from the model. 
Variable addition tests were then conducted on the following variables not 
included in (3): VIX Index and the 24-month rolling standard deviation of the 
Eurodollar rate, ISM-Index, and ten year CPI inflation – the first lagged levels 
and twelve lagged differences being considered for each factor. However, all of 
these variables are jointly insignificant at the 5% level, which is in line with the 
results of Rudebusch et al. (2006, p. 25) who find that from the volatility variables 
“[t]he most significant and robust explanatory variable is the implied volatility on 
longer-term Treasuries.” (i.e. the MOVE Index). The resulting model (reported as 
(i) in Table 2 in the Results section) shows no evident misspecification at the 5%-
level in terms of autocorrelation (lags 1...12), non-normally distributed residuals 
and heteroscedasticity [Arch (lags 1...12) and White tests]. According to 
Ramsey’s Reset test the appropriate functional form is linear and the Wu-
Hausman test indicates that all contemporaneous variables are weakly exogenous. 
Further, the bounds test (with unrestricted intercept) – critical values are taken 
from Pesaran et al. (2001) – confirms that the level variables are mutually 
cointegrated irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1)11. 
 
11
 The F-test applied with unrestricted intercept deletes all lagged level terms (but not the intercept) from the model – 
the number of lagged level terms (excluding  ) determines the degrees of freedom. For the F-test and t-test the critical 
14 
 
However, unreported CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares Test indicate a 
structural break. This is in line with the findings of ECB (2006), which reports a 
structural change in 1999, and Wu (2005) who finds a structural break between 
2000 and 2002. Therefore, a Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test (35% trimming) 
was undertaken. According to this test, the maximum likelihood for a break is in 
November 1998, although a break is only indicated at the 10% level. However, a 
Chow breakpoint test finds that a break occurred in November 1998 at the 5% 
level (Table 1, first column).We note that according to the Chow test no structural 
break occurred in June 2004, when the conundrum period started. Considering all 
of these results and those of past studies we believe that it is reasonable to 
consider the possibility of a break in November 1998. 
TABLE 1 — RESULTS BREAKPOINT TESTS 
 
Notes: This table shows the results of the Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint tests (35% trimmed data, probabilities 
calculated using Hansen’s (1997) method) and the Chow breakpoint tests for all our models. The presented figures are F-
statistic probabilities and dates. 
 
To model the structural break, shift variables for all the significant independent 
variables were created with the value zero before the break and the original value 
of the variable after the break. All of these shift variables were jointly included in 
the model. The jointly insignificant variables were subsequently excluded (first 
the shift variables and then the non-shift variables) to obtain the final 
parsimonious model. This model (reported as (ii) in Table 2) has a superior fit to 
the model without a break, no misspecification is evident and its level variables 
                                                                                                                                     
values corresponding to the I(1) bound are reported in the table because breaching these values confirms cointegration 
regardless of the variables’ order of integration. 
Treasury model Corporate model Agency model Municipal model
Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test
Max Likelihood Ratio F-statistic prob. 0.062 0.005 0.000 0.001
Max date 1998:11 1999:02 2001:04 2001:04
Chow breakpoint test
F-stat. prob. at Quandt-Andrews max date 0.018 0.003 0.000 0.001
F-stat. prob. 2004:06 0.873 0.849 0.186 0.742
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are mutually cointegrated12. Further, the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares Test 
indicate no other structural break after November 1998 (the Quandt-Andrews test 
cannot be effectively applied in this model because of the shift variables). 
Agency, corporate and municipal yield models.—The model selection 
procedure for the other bond models is essentially the same as that for the 
Treasury yield model. In addition to the macroeconomic and risk variables that 
are significant in the Treasury model, the 24-month rolling standard deviation of 
changes in the long rates for each bond class and the EDF for AAA-rated 
corporate bonds were tested for significance (again with lags 1...12 for the 
differenced variables). Furthermore, we also controlled for an increase in foreign 
and domestic investor demand for each bond class13. Having established 
parsimonious models for agency, corporate and municipal bond yields, breakpoint 
tests were carried out. In line with the Treasury model, these tests indicated a 
structural break for each bond class (Table 1). Hence, for each model shift 
variables were tested for their significance in line with the above described 
procedure. 
The resulting parsimonious models show no evident misspecification, the level 
variables are mutually cointegrated (reported in Table 3 in the Results section) 
and, in particular, the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares Test indicate no further 
structural breaks. All of our favored models for inference include shift variables 
 
12
 Because the shift variables are related to the non-shift variables the degrees of freedom for the cointegration test are 
uncertain. One could, for example, either treat the shift and non-shift components of a particular variable as one covariate 
or two separate variables for calculating degrees of freedom. Following Shin et al. (2011) we consider critical values using 
degrees of freedom calculated in both of these ways, thereby forming further upper and lower bounds of the test for the 
already existing upper and lower bounds (related to uncertainty over the variables’ orders of integration). If the F-statistic 
(t-ratio) exceeds (is below) the critical value’s bound for I(1) processes treating shift and non-shift components of a 
variable as one (two) covariate(s) there is unambiguous evidence of cointegration and we use these criteria in our 
application. We extrapolate some of the critical values reported in Pesaran et al (2001) when the number of variables used 
to calculate the degrees of freedom exceed 10. We also note that the use of this cointegration test in a model allowing for 
structural breaks represents one of the novelties of this paper. 
13
 Only those investor groups that had significant holdings in June 2007 (i.e. only investor groups with a holdings ratio 
of above 1%) and that increased their holdings ratio in the respective bond class during the conundrum period were 
included in each model. 
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and are discussed in the next section. Due to space limitations only the models 
that account for the structural break are presented for the agency, corporate and 
municipal bond yields (all of these models have a superior fit compared to those 
without a break). The long run solutions for our favored parsimonious dynamic 
models (with breaks) are reported in Table 4 in the Results section (the Appendix 
discusses how the equilibrium coefficients and their corresponding standard errors 
are obtained).  
II. Results 
A. Treasury yield model 
The results of the Treasury model confirm previous findings that an increase in 
the demand from foreign governments had a negative impact on the long term 
Treasury yield (Table 2). According to our favored model for inference, model 
(ii), an increase in foreign government demand had a consistently negative impact 
on the 10-year US Treasury yield throughout the whole sample period in the short 
and long run. That is, ceteris paribus, an increase of the foreign official holdings 
ratio by 1% point had a negative impact on the yield of around 9 basis points (bp) 
in the long run. This magnitude is similar to the 7 bp impact of total foreign 
holdings that Bandholz et al. (2009) found in their VECM model. Foreign private 
investors also had a negative impact in the long run before November 1998 but 
their impact became insignificant thereafter. The most likely explanation for this 
change is that although between August 1994 and November 1998 the holdings 
ratio of foreign private investors increased steadily (by a total of 11% points), 
after the latter date it began to decline (for example, it declined by 3.5% points in 
the conundrum period June 2004 to June 2007). Hence, private investors put no 
further demand pressure on the yield in the post break period. 
17 
 
All the control variables have the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. 
The short term interest rate has a positive impact in both the short run and the 
long run, but after November 1998 this impact becomes much smaller in both 
cases. This finding supports Greenwald and Stiglitz’s (2003) argument that 
financial innovation fostered a decoupling of long term interest rates from short 
term rates. To be specific, we find that, ceteris paribus, before November 1998 a 
1% point increase in the short term interest rate leads to a 45 bp increase in the 
Treasury yield in the long run, with this impact declining to 11 bp after this date. 
These magnitudes are in line with other studies, e.g. Warnock and Cacdac 
Warnock (2009) who find that the impact is 37 bp (but who do not consider a 
possible shift in the relationship between short term and long term interest rates).  
Higher growth expectations are also found to lead to an increase in the 
Treasury yield, but here again the impact becomes smaller after the break: thus, 
ceteris paribus, in the conundrum period a 1% increase of the ISM Index raised 
the yield by about 2.5 bp. This result is similar to Bandholz et al. (2009) who 
report an impact of about 2 bp. In contrast, the long run impact of inflation, stock 
prices and the volatility of Treasuries on the yield remains unchanged throughout 
the whole period. Ceteris paribus, a 1% point rise in the PCE deflator increases 
the yield by 94 bp, a 1000 point increase in the Dow Jones Index raises the yield 
by 45 bp (in line with Idier et al. 2007) who find that a 1% increase in stock 
returns has an impact of 42 bp) and an increase of the MOVE Index by 10 points 
increases the yield by 7 bp in the long term. 
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TABLE 2 — PARSIMONIOUS MODEL OF THE NOMINAL 10-YEAR TREASURY YIELD 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-model for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. Where ∆ is the 
difference operator, the number of lags are indicated in parentheses as a suffix to a variable’s name, s11/98 indicates the shift 
component of a variable and the date of the structural break (i.e. after November 1998), YIELD is the 10-year nominal 
Treasury yield, FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term Treasuries, 
FORPRIVATE are foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term Treasuries, EURDOL is the 3-month 
Eurodollar rate, LOGISM is the log of the ISM-Index, PCE is the actual PCE inflation rate, CPI10Y are 10-year CPI 
inflation expectations, DOW is the value of the Dow Jones Index, and MOVE is the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility 
Estimate Index. Intercepts are not reported but are included in the models. In each column coefficients and t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) are reported. Probability values for all misspecification tests are reported in the section headed 
misspecification/cointegration tests, where BG(x) denotes the probability value of the Breusch-Godfrey test for x order 
correlation and Arch(x) the probability value of the ARCH heteroskedasticity test with x lags. The 5% critical values for 
the bounds cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) F=3.39, t=-4.72, (ii) F=3.50, t=-5.03 [(i) k=8, 
(ii) k=10 (t), k=7 (F)] – see Pesaran et al. (2001). The significance of a coefficient or test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -0.2174*** (-6.44) -0.2155*** (-6.81)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(-1)) -0.1273*** (-3.58) -0.1325*** (-4.11) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(EUR_DOL)   0.3279***   (3.42)   0.7202***   (4.38) FORPRIVATE -0.2396*** (-5.82
∆(EURDOL)
s11/98 -0.5256*** (-2.98) EURDOL   0.4478***   (4.50)
∆(EURDOL(-1)) -0.2459*** (-2.62) -0.1630* (-1.78) LOGISM   3.3286***   (5.52)
∆(LOGISM)   0.9202**   (2.31)   1.0200***   (2.65) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
∆(LOGISM(-1))   1.1464***  (3.17)   1.6376***  (2.86) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
∆(LOGISM(-1))
s11/98 -1.2539* (-1.80) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
∆(LOGISM(-4))   1.0097***   (2.83)   0.8844***   (2.66)
∆(PCE)   0.5404***   (2.72)   0.5403***   (2.90) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(PCE(-9)) -0.6486*** (-2.98) -0.6432*** (-3.12) FORPRIVATE   0.0038   (0.07)
∆(DOW)   0.0001**   (2.36)   0.0001**   (3.14) EURDOL   0.1113***  (2.85)
∆(DOW(-1))   0.0001**   (2.50) LOGISM   2.5283***   (3.61)
YIELD(-1) -0.2835*** (-6.13) -0.3795*** (-6.63) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
FOROFFICIAL(-1) -0.0224*** (-3.46) -0.0358*** (-4.67) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.0252** (-2.07) -0.0909*** (-6.50) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
FORPRIVATE(-1)
s11/98   0.0924***   (3.62)
EURDOL(-1)   0.0535***   (3.36)   0.1700***   (3.45)
EURDOL(-1)
s11/98 -0.1277*** (-2.73)        (i)    (ii)
LOGISM(-1)   0.8877***   (2.91)   1.2634***   (4.69) BG(2) prob.      0.16   0.24
LOGISM(-1)
s11/98   0.3038** (-2.29) BG(12) prob.      0.25   0.36
PCE(-1)   0.2431**   (2.28)   0.3578***   (3.28) Jarque-Bera prob.      0.44   0.26
CPI10Y(-1)   0.3855**   (2.05) Arch(1) prob.      0.90   0.56
DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (3.53)   0.0002***   (5.88) Arch(12) prob.      0.56   0.49
MOVE(-1)   0.0021**   (2.27)   0.0027***   (2.78) White prob.      0.34   0.61
adj. R-squared 0.58 0.64 Ramsey LR prob.      0.87   0.15
Schwarz criterion -0.47 -0.54 Wu-Hausm. prob.      0.85   0.58
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 observations) Bounds test F-stat.   6.44***   8.20***
Bounds test t-stat. -6.13*** -6.63***
after the break
(iii) equilibrium long-run effects of (ii)(ii) with break(i) without break
before the break
misspecification/cointegration tests
19 
 
In order to make these results more palpable and identify which of the 
variables included in the Treasury model (ii) were responsible for the ‘bond yield 
conundrum’ the marginal cumulative impact (MCI14) of each of these variables on 
the Treasury yield is used. June 2004 to June 2007 is chosen as the reference 
period for this exercise because it spans the beginning of US monetary tightening 
and the subsequent debate on the ‘bond yield conundrum’. The MCI of each 
variable depends on the coefficients (including the changes due to the break 
where applicable) of the differenced and lagged level variables and on the 
changes in the data of the variable. Thus, the formula for calculating the MCI for 
each month is: 
(4) 6+789: = 1∆9 + 1<=∆9 +⋯+ 12∆9−12 + 12<=∆9−12 + 139−1 + 13<=9−1 
(5) AB6: = 6+789: − 6+789:$':( 
 
Figure 3 shows that foreign official demand has the largest negative MCI on 
the yield in the reference period, which can therefore be seen as mainly 
responsible for the conundrum, while foreign private demand by contrast had 
virtually no impact in this period. Our model’s finding that the increase in foreign 
official Treasury holdings depressed the yield by as much as 60 bp during the 
conundrum period is similar to previous findings: Bandholz et al. (2009) report an 
impact of 70 bp between 2003 and 2006, Craine and Martin (2009) one of 80 bp 
between 2004 and 2006, and Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009) one of 80 bp 
between 1984 and May 200515. In addition to foreign official demand, pessimistic 
 
14
 The MCI is the difference in a particular variable's contribution to the yield in any particular period relative to a 
reference point (in our case May 2004). 
15
 These reported impacts are of course influenced by the chosen reference point. If February 1994 is taken as the 
starting point foreign official demand will be found to have depressed the 10-year Treasury yield by as much as 128 bp in 
the conundrum period. However, if January 2003 is taken as the starting point the size of the impact is 70 bp, exactly the 
amount reported in Bandholz et al. (2009). 
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expectations about the business cycle (ISM Index) and a decrease of the implied 
yield volatility (MOVE Index) also had a negative impact on the Treasury yield of 
about 20 bp each and therefore also partly explain the conundrum. Counteracting 
these factors were the increases in short term interest rates and in core price 
inflation, both of which had a small positive impact of about 20 bp, and the rise in 
stock prices, which had a relatively larger positive impact of almost 60 bp.  
According to the implied yield of our favored model for inference, which fits 
the actual Treasury yield remarkably well during the conundrum period, these 
forces seem to explain the conundrum fully (see Figure 4 for the yield 
residuals)16. Thus, our model improves upon existing Treasury bond models. For 
example, ECB (2006), Rudebusch et al. (2006), Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 
(2009), Eijffinger et al. (2010), and Rudebusch (2010) all report that their models 
overestimate the long term Treasury yield after June 2004, while Bandholz et al.’s 
(2009) model overvalues the yield throughout the year 200517.  
 
 
16
 The residuals of the yield have been calculated as follows: actual yield – fitted yield (where fitted yield = fitted ∆yield 
+ actual yieldt-1). 
17
 Not all existing studies report their model residuals, see e.g. Idier et al. (2007), and Craine and Martin (2009). 
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FIGURE 3. VARIABLES’ MCIS FOR THE NOMINAL 10-YEAR TREASURY YIELD  
Notes: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal 10-year Treasury yield for each 
month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our Treasury bond model (ii) (see Table 2). 
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FIGURE 4. YIELD RESIDUALS  
Notes: These plots show how well the implied yield values of the respective models fit the respective long-term bond 
yields. 
 
The reason why our model appears to explain the Treasury yield conundrum 
better than previous models most likely lies in our different modelling strategy. In 
contrast to the previous literature, we consider more variables in our model 
(whilst accounting for non-stationarity) and we model the evident structural 
break. Indeed, Rudebusch et al. (2006), Rudebusch (2010) and Eijffinger (2010) 
use a VECM model that does not directly include foreign official demand18, 
which our model found to be the most important variable in explaining the 
conundrum. Furthermore, the above authors do not take into account the 
 
18
 Rudebusch et al. (2006) test if foreign official demand is correlated with the error term of their model, and find no 
correlation (they use custodial data from the New York Fed (FRBNY) as a proxy for foreign official holdings; this seems 
not be the best proxy because “… some foreign governments avoid the FRBNY and thus this source is best described as 
only partial” (Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 2009, p. 905). However, this finding does not imply that the model results 
would be the same if the variable is fully incorporated in the model. 
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possibility that the impact of the short term interest rate on the 10-year Treasury 
yield during the conundrum period was smaller than before November 1998. 
The incorporation of this possibility in our model also seems to provide a 
major explanation of why it fits the yield better than do the models of Bandholz et 
al. (2009) and Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009). These authors’ models 
attribute a higher impact than our model does to the short term interest rate during 
the conundrum period (with long run coefficients of 0.37 and 0.33, respectively). 
An additional point is that these authors’ studies appear to overestimate the yield 
either because they do not include a measure for interest rate volatility (Bandholz 
et al.) or because they use the rolling standard deviation of long yields to proxy 
the volatility of yields (Warnock and Cacdac Warnock) – in contrast to the 
MOVE Index, the rolling standard deviation does not indicate a decline in 
volatility during the conundrum period. 
B. Agency, corporate and municipal bond yield models 
The results of the agency, corporate and municipal yield models clearly indicate 
that investor demand also played a major role in explaining the low long term 
yields of non-Treasury AAA-rated bonds (Table 3 and Table 4). In line with the 
Treasury yield model, these models fit the data well in the conundrum period (see 
Figure 4), and all control variables have the expected signs and reasonable 
magnitudes. However, in some cases the magnitudes differ significantly. Next to 
noise, the most likely explanation for this observation is that investors do not see 
these different bond classes as perfect substitutes and therefore ask for different 
adjustments in prices when conditions are changing. Indeed Previous studies 
confirm that investors value different bond classes differently even while they 
may carry the same credit rating (see e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson 
(2007)). 
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TABLE 3 — PARSIMONIOUS MODEL OF THE NOMINAL LONG TERM YIELDS OF AAA-RATED NON-TREASURY US SECURITIES 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-rated 
corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table 2, with the following 
exceptions: sx/x indicates the shift component of a variable with the date of the structural break indicated by x/x (i.e. after 
February 1999 and after April 2001), YIELD is the 10-year nominal yield of the respective bond class,  FOROFFICIAL are 
foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds (i.e. the holdings ratio) of the respective bond class, 
FORPRIVATE is the foreign private holdings ratio of the respective bond class, FOREIGN is the foreign holdings ratio of 
municipal bonds, USBANK is the US banking institutions holdings ratio of the respective bond class, USINDIVIDUAL is 
the US individual holdings ratio of the respective bond class, USINSURANCE is the US insurance companies holdings 
ratio of the respective bond class, USPENSION is the US pension funds holdings ratio of the respective bond class, and 
EDFAAA is Moody’s expected default frequency for AAA-rated corporate bonds. The 5% critical values for a Bounds 
cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) F=3.30, t≈-5.20 , (ii) F=3.39, t=-5.03, (iii) F=3.24, t≈-5.20 
[(i) k=11 (t), k=9 (F) (ii) k=10 (t), k=8 (F) (iii) k=10 (F), k=11 (t)] – see Pesaran et al. (2001). 
 
 
  
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -1.7414*** (-5.68) ∆(YIELD(-1))   0.0956   (1.61) ∆(YIELD(-1))
s04/01
  0.4644***   (4.57)
∆(FORPRIVATE) -0.4600*** (-3.45) ∆(FORPRIVATE) -0.3983*** (-9.59) ∆(YIELD(-1))
s04/01
  0.3334***   (3.59)
∆(USINDIVIDUALS) -0.1321*** (-2.98) ∆(FORPRIVATE(-1)) -0.2464*** (-5.10) ∆(YIELD(-3))
s04/01
  0.2833***   (3.22)
∆(EURDOL)   0.4803***   (3.80) ∆(US INDIVIDUAL(-1)) -0.1792*** (-5.90) ∆(YIELD(-4))   0.2293***   (3.70)
∆(LOGISM)   1.4678***   (3.11) ∆(USBANK(-1)) -0.3478*** (-4.28) ∆(YIELD(-5))   0.2166***   (3.62)
∆(PCE)   0.6020**   (2.50) ∆(EURDOL(-1)) -0.1658*** (-2.59) ∆(EURDOL)   0.7231***   (8.42)
∆(PCE(-2))
s04/01
-0.8739*** (-2.82) ∆(EURDOL(-8))
s02/99
-0.3045*** (-4.24) ∆(EURDOL(-2))
s04/01
-0.3469** (-2.34)
∆(DOW)
s04/01   0.0003***   (4.95) ∆(EURDOL(-11))   0.1275**   (2.24) ∆(EURDOL(-8))
s04/01
-0.3734*** (-2.87)
∆(MOVE)
s04/01
  0.0094***   (4.95) ∆(LOGISM)   0.6734**   (2.39) ∆(PCE)   0.9009***   (5.03)
YIELD(-1) -0.4101*** (-7.87) ∆(LOGISM(-1))   1.5553***   (3.82) ∆(DOW)s04/01   0.0002***   (3.85)
FOROFFICIAL(-1) -0.4626*** (-3.27) ∆(LOGISM(-1))
s02/99
-1.4720*** (-3.03) ∆(DOW(-5))   0.0001***   (2.61)
FOROFFICIAL(-1)
s04/01
  0.4027***   (3.32) ∆(PCE)   0.4381***   (3.29) ∆(MOVE)   0.0033***   (3.19)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.2168*** (-3.11) ∆(PCE(-9)) -0.4191*** (-2.91) ∆(MOVE(-2)) -0.0027*** (-2.96)
USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.0514*** (-3.54) ∆(DOW)   0.0001***   (3.21) YIELD10(-1) -0.5913*** (-8.75)
USPENSION(-1)
s04/01
-0.1441*** (-3.07) YIELD(-1) -0.2273*** (-6.56) YIELD(-1)
s04/01
-0.4765*** (-6.14)
EURDOL(-1)   0.2218***   (5.02) FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.2113*** (-5.37) FOREIGN(-1) -4.9958*** (-6.30)
LOGISM(-1)   1.3153***   (4.34) FORPRIVATE(-1)
s02/99
  0.1615***   (4.50) FOREIGN(-1)
s04/01
  4.1318***   (6.05)
PCE(-1)   0.8260***   (6.30) EURDOL(-1)   0.0664***   (4.83) USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.1010*** (-4.27)
DOW(-1)   0.0002***   (4.53) LOGISM(-1)   0.6125***   (3.51) USINSURANCE(-1) -0.0747*** (-2.60)
MOVE(-1)   0.0036**   (2.24) LOGISM(-1)
s02/99
-0.5380*** (-4.33) USBANK(-1) -0.2470** (-2.07)
MOVE(-1)
s04/01
  0.0061***   (2.80) PCE(-1)   0.1906***   (2.88) EURDOL(-1)   0.2054***   (6.09)
adj. R-squared CPI10Y(-1)   0.3002**   (2.29) LOGISM(-1)   0.6388***   (2.73)
Schwarz criterion DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (5.61) PCE(-1)   0.3050***   (3.66)
Sample: 1995:01 to 2007:06 (150 obs.) MOVE(-1)   0.0016**   (2.34) DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (3.71)
EDFAAA(-1)   3.0898***   (5.60) MOVE(-1)   0.0055***   (4.82)
adj. R-squared adj. R-squared 0.57
Schwarz criterion Schwarz criterion -0.61
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.) Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.)
Results misspecification/cointegration tests
BG(2) prob.: (i) 0.89, (ii) 0.65, (iii) 0.23         BG(12) prob.: (i) 0.26, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.10         Jarque-Bera prob.: (i) 0.44, (ii) 0.99, (iii) 0.54
-1.19
(i) Agency (ii) Corporate
Bounds test: F-stat. (i) 8.68***, (ii) 10.41***, (iii) 10.39***; t-stat. (i) -7.87***, (ii) -6.56***, (iii) -9.85***
Arch(1) prob.: (i) 0.61, (ii) 0.86, (iii) 0.41     Arch(12) prob.: (i) 0.56, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.87      White prob.:  (i) 0.47, (ii) 0.31, (iii) 0.06
Ramsey LR prob.: (i) 0.16, (ii) 0.26, (iii) 0.23      Wu-Hausman Prob.: F-stat. (i) 0.46, (ii) 0.55, (iii) 0.86
(iii) Municipal
0.63
-0.09
0.71
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TABLE 4 — EQUILIBRIUM LONG RUN IMPACTS ON THE NOMINAL LONG TERM YIELDS OF AAA-RATED 
NON-TREASURY US SECURITIES 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the equilibrium results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-
rated corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Agency bond yield.—Foreign official demand had a negative impact not only 
on the Treasury yield but also on the agency bond yield both in the short run 
(Table 3, column 1) and in the long run (Table 4, column 1). However, in contrast 
to the Treasury yield model, the long run magnitude of the impact declines after 
the break. This said, it appears that, ceteris paribus, from April 2001 onwards an 
increase in the holdings ratio by 1% point still reduced the yield by around 15 bp 
in the long run. The most probable explanation for the shift in the variable’s 
coefficient is the change in the foreign official holdings ratio: while this ratio 
increased moderately in the pre break period, it increased considerably in the post 
break period (from 3% in April 2001 to 11% in June 2007). This development in 
turn helps to explain why market reactions to increases in foreign official holdings 
in the post break period were comparatively modest relative to the pre-break 
period given that there was now less scope for price increases (yield decreases) 
per unit of  increase in the foreign official holdings ratio. 
FOROFFICIAL -1.1282*** (-3.82) FORPRIVATE -0.9298*** (-5.39) FOREIGN -8.4493*** (-5.64)
FORPRIVATE -0.5286*** (-3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL -0.1709*** (-4.33)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.1253*** (-3.93) LOGISM   2.6953***   (3.24) USINSURANCE -0.1263*** (-2.83)
USPENSION PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK -0.4178** (-2.08)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.3473***   (8.47)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   1.0805***   (3.17)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.5159***   (3.74)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0002***   (3.36)
MOVE   0.0088**   (2.20) MOVE   0.0093***   (4.63)
FOROFFICIAL -0.1462* (-1.73) FORPRIVATE -0.2193*** (-5.63) FOREIGN -0.8091*** (-7.00)
FORPRIVATE -0.5286*** (-3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0946*** (-5.45)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.1253*** (-3.93) LOGISM   0.3282   (0.43) USINSURANCE -0.0699*** (-2.92)
USPENSION -0.3514*** (-3.10) PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK -0.2314** (-2.18)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.1923***   (7.97)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   0.5983***   (2.88)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.2857***   (3.94)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0001***   (4.07)
MOVE   0.0237***   (5.91) MOVE   0.0051***   (4.58)
after the break after the break after the break
(i) Agency bond yield (ii) Corporate bond yield (iii) Municipal bond yield
before the break before the break before the break
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By contrast, the impact of foreign private and US individual investors on the 
long term agency bond yield remained stable throughout the whole sample period. 
Each 1% point increase in the foreign private holdings ratio led to a decline in the 
yield of around 53 bp in the long run, while the same increase in the domestic 
individual holdings ratio lowered the yield by 13 bp. US pension funds only had 
an impact on the yield after the break: from April 2001 onwards the yield was 
depressed by 35 bp for each 1% point increase in the pension funds’ holdings 
ratio. The shift in this variable took place because domestic pension funds only 
increased their holdings ratio significantly in the post break period. Possible 
explanations as to why the magnitudes of the coefficients of these three investor 
groups were so different are that they reacted differently to expected changes in 
the agency yield or that they had different expectations of future yields. US 
individual investors, for example, might have increased their holdings to a lesser 
extent than foreign private investors and pension funds when they (rightly) 
expected the agency yield to decrease and hence put less additional pressure on 
yields than their counterparts. 
The MCI suggests that investor demand was also the main reason for the low 
long term agency yield during the conundrum period (Figure 5). This is especially 
true for foreign official investors who, according to our model, depressed the 
yield by as much as 107 bp. However, it is the case that private foreign and 
domestic investor demand also helped to reduce the yield, by around 39 bp and 26 
bp respectively. This downward pressure on yields, further fuelled by pessimistic 
expectations about the business cycle and a lowering of the implied yield 
volatility, was mainly offset by the rise in the short term interest rate and by the 
increases in stock prices and in core price inflation. 
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FIGURE 5. VARIABLES’ MCIS FOR THE NOMINAL 10-YEAR AGENCY BOND YIELD 
Notes: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal 10-year Agency yield for each 
month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our agency bond model (see Table 3). 
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Corporate bond yield.—Foreign private investors invested heavily in the 
corporate bond market between 1994 and mid-2007, their holdings ratio more 
than doubling (from 11% to 24.5%) during this period, with the result that they 
put significant downward pressure on AAA-rated corporate bond yields in the 
short run (Table 3) and in the long run (Table 4). Regarding the long run, in the 
post break period an increase in the foreign private investors’ holdings ratio by 
1% point led to a decrease of the yield by about 22 bp (compared to a 93 bp 
reduction prior to the break). The explanation for the shift in the variable’s 
coefficient is probably the same as that regarding foreign official holdings in the 
agency bond model inasmuch as the increase in the holdings ratio of foreign 
private investors mainly took place after the break, in this case after February 
1999. Domestic investors also had some negative impact on the yield when they 
increased their holdings ratio, although only in the short run. 
Our proxy for default risk of AAA-rated corporate bonds (EDFAAA)19 has the 
expected sign and a reasonable magnitude (as we will see below). A puzzling 
result is that an increase in growth expectations is not significant in the long run 
after the break – in the Treasury model the impact of the ISM Index is lower after 
the break, though it remains highly significant. A possible reason is that in the 
post break period the increase in investor demand for corporate bonds (which are 
more attractive in an upswing) and the request for higher yields (due to expected 
inflationary pressure and an expected rise in the federal funds rate) offset each 
other when the ISM Index increased and vice versa. 
 
 
19
 Corporate bonds are the only AAA-rated traditional fixed income asset class which is not directly (Treasuries and 
municipal bonds) or indirectly (agency bonds) backed by a governmental organization. 
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FIGURE 6. VARIABLES’ MCIS FOR THE NOMINAL AAA-RATED CORPORATE BOND YIELD 
Notes: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal AAA-rated corporate bond yield 
for each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our corporate yield model (see Table 3). 
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Once again, the MCI shows that investor demand was the main suppressing 
force in the conundrum period (Figure 6). Between June 2004 and June 2007 the 
yield of AAA-rated corporate bonds was lowered by as much as 69 bp due to 
demand pressure from foreign private investors, and by as much as 15 bp due to 
higher demand from domestic investors. Lower yield volatility and a lower 
default risk for AAA-rated corporate bonds added to this pressure. The main 
counteracting forces were increases in the Eurodollar rate and increases in stock 
market prices. 
Municipal bond yield.—Finally, an increase in foreign demand for 10-year 
AAA-rated municipal bonds also had a negative impact on their yield, albeit that 
it is not clear from the available data whether this demand came mainly from 
foreign official sources or from foreign private sources. It appears that after the 
break (April 2001) a 1% point increase in the holdings ratio of foreigners 
decreased the municipal bond yield by 81 bp in the long run (Table 4). The 
magnitude of the foreign demand coefficient is smaller after the break, probably 
for the same reasons that applied to the agency bond market case: market 
reactions to increases in foreign holdings in the post break period were 
comparatively more muted given that there was now less scope for price increases 
(yield decreases) per unit of increase in the foreign holdings ratio. Domestic 
individual investors, banks and insurance companies also appeared to put 
downward pressure on the municipal bond yield when they increased their 
holdings ratios, albeit that the magnitudes of these demand coefficients differ 
(these differences possibly stemming from differences in expectations or in the 
reactions to expectations as previously argued).   
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FIGURE 7. VARIABLES’ MCIS FOR THE NOMINAL AAA-RATED MUNICIPAL BOND YIELD 
Notes: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal 10-year municipal bond yield for 
each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our municipal yield model (see Table 3). 
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The findings for the different variables’ MCIs are similar those reported 
previously (Figure 7), the one main difference being that the low municipal bond 
yield in the conundrum period seems to be primarily caused by domestic investors 
who lowered the yield by as much as 34 bp while foreign investors lowered it by 
no more than 31 bp. This finding is in keeping with the fact that foreign investors 
do not benefit from the tax advantages of municipal bonds as do domestic 
investors and are therefore much less active in the municipal bond market. 20 
Lower growth expectations and interest rate volatility appear to have added to the 
downward demand pressure, while increases in the short term interest rate and in 
stock market prices acted as counter forces. 
III. Investor demand and subprime crisis 
The US bond yield conundrum has generated much discussion regarding its 
magnitude and the factors behind it for good reason. As Wu (2008) has argued: 
“The correct understanding and quantification of the conundrum have direct 
implications for monetary policy…” (p. 2). While we certainly agree with this 
argument we also believe that a ‘correct understanding and quantification of the 
conundrum’ as manifested in all of the major US bond markets - and not merely 
in the market for Treasuries – can help to shed more light on the root causes of the 
recent financial crisis and, in so doing, help guide policy makers in their attempts 
to prevent a similar crisis on this scale in the future. The logic behind this position 
is straightforward. 
The securities at the epicenter of the financial crisis which broke out in the 
summer of 2007 were CDOs. The estimated amount of CDOs in 2002 was about 
$1/4 trillion and yet by the time of the crisis that figure had multiplied twelvefold 
 
20
 “Short-maturity municipal yields are equal to the Treasury yield multiplied by one minus the income tax rate, and the 
ratio between municipal and Treasury yields decreases with maturity.” (Ang et al. 2010, p. 566). Hence, the average yield 
of municipal bonds is normally lower than that of Treasury, corporate and agency bonds with the same maturity. 
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to about $3 trillion with the bulk of it comprising of triple AAA rated tranches 
(Blundell-Wignall (2007)). One of the unresolved questions regarding this rapid 
increase in the CDO market concerns the precise role played by investor demand. 
Did this demand play a merely passive role? Yields in the other debt securities 
markets were unusually low in the immediate pre-crisis period and so investors 
would have been happy to accept the higher yielding CDOs, but was the quest for 
fees and commissions on the part of the banks and their associates the more 
important driving force behind the rapid acceleration in CDO production? Or did 
investor demand play a more active role in the growth of the CDO market? The 
US financial institutions may have profited handsomely from the creation and 
distribution of CDOs but were these institutions also under enormous external 
pressure to do all of this in order to make up for the shortfall in the supply of other 
US safe assets? 
If the answer to the above question is that investor demand did indeed play a 
secondary role in CDO growth then it is entirely correct for policy makers to 
concentrate their efforts on rectifying the various institutional and regulatory 
errors and failures that allowed the US banking system to create the toxic debt 
securities on so large a scale in such a short time span. However, this policy 
approach would not on its own prevent future financial crises if it turned out that 
the demand for extra safe assets was in fact the more important driver behind 
CDO growth, as recent research from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) 
suggests. From this alternative, demand-side, perspective on CDO growth “the 
core policy problem to deal with is how to bridge the safe asset gap without over-
exposing the financial sector to systemic risk.” (Caballero, 2010, p. 6). Thus, 
imposing various new rules and restrictions on the US financial sector’s ability to 
create debt assets will not only “...not help to deal with the structural problem of 
excess safe-asset demand.” but will also have the opposite effect of worsening the 
safe asset gap, the potential “...cost of this policy distortion [being] stronger 
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headwinds for the recovery and the risk that the same pattern of systemically-
vulnerable safe-asset creation may migrate to somewhere else in the world that is 
even less prepared to absorb the systemic risk.” (ibid, p. 6-7). 
Caballero’s take on the major policy lessons of the subprime crisis remains a 
minority one and a possible reason for this is that to date there has been no 
comprehensive attempt at econometrically testing the strength of foreign and 
domestic demand for US safe assets in the pre-crisis era. The crux of the matter is 
that CDOs are essentially ‘second-floor’ debt securities, securities backed by 
securities. Thus, for the demand-pull version of the CDO growth story to be really 
credible, it has to be convincingly demonstrated that the pressure of aggregate 
demand for safe stores of value was so great that the combined capacity of all the 
US ‘ground floor’ debt securities markets (those for corporate and municipal 
securities in addition to that for Treasuries) and of the US ‘first floor’ securities 
markets (those for agency and other asset backed securities) was simply not large 
enough to fully accommodate that pressure. We believe that the econometric 
results generated in this paper amount to such a demonstration insofar as they 
consistently point to significant and substantial downward demand pressure on all 
US bond yields in the pre-crisis period. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our models fully explain the US bond yield conundrum of 2004 to 2007 as 
found not only in relation to US Treasuries but also in relation to all of the other 
traditional AAA-rated US debt securities, something that has not been achieved in 
the previous literature. We attribute this result to the incorporation of a broader set 
of variables than is usual in our models, this being made possible by the adoption 
of the ARDL approach, and to the allowance for evident structural change around 
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the time of the millennium (the latter confirming findings of previous authors). It 
is especially noteworthy that demand variables are found to be the most 
prominent factor in explaining the unusually low US bond yields during the 
conundrum period. These findings have substantial policy implications in that 
they provide strong support for the hitherto underexplored hypothesis that excess 
safe asset demand on the part of investors rather than excess greed on the part of 
the banks was the chief force that drove the expansion of the US CDO market 
well beyond what was prudent. 
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Appendix. — approximate equilibrium coefficient standard errors in an 
(unrestricted) ARDL model with a one-time structural break 
Consider the general (unrestricted) ARDL model with error-correction form 
that allows the coefficients to change at one particular point in time: 
(A1) ΔE = E +  +  +⋯+  + F(G × E) +FG + F(G × ) + ⋯+ F(G × ) + ∑ ΔE +∑ Δ +⋯+∑ Δ + ∑ F(G × ΔE) +∑ F (G × Δ) +⋯+ ∑ F (G × Δ) + ! 
 
where, G = 0 in the pre-break period and G = 1  on and after the break point 
period. 
 
Letting JK = (E, , … , ), the static equilibrium of (A1) can be derived by 
applying JK = JK = ⋯ = JK  and recognising that ! = 0 in equilibrium, thus:  
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(A2) E = −MNOPNOQRSTOPTOQRSU − MNVPNVQRSTOPTOQRSU  −⋯− MNWPNWQRSTOPTOQRSU 
 
The equilibrium in the pre-break and post-break periods are obtained by 
substituting G = 0 and G = 1, respectively, into (A2), thus: 
(A3) E = ∗ + ∗ +⋯+ ∗, where,  ∗ = −MNYTOU , Z = 0, 1, … , [	 
(A4) E = F∗ + F∗ +⋯+ F∗, where,  F∗ = −\NYPNYQTOPTOQ] , Z = 0, 1, … , [	 
 
Since the equilibrium coefficients involve quotients of the coefficients in (A1) 
we use the formula given in De Boef and Keele (2008) to approximate the 
standard errors of the equilibrium coefficients, denoted *NY∗  and *NYQ∗  for the pre- 
and post-break periods, respectively. Since the pre-equilibrium coefficients can be 
obtained from the post-equilibrium coefficients by substituting F =  F = 0 into 
the latter we specify this approximation only for *NYQ∗ . That is,  
(A5) *NYQ∗ = ^_7( F∗) = ^_7 \ NYPNYQTOTOQ] 
= ` 4TOTOQ5a _7( +  F) + 4NYPNYQ5a4TOTOQ5b _7(− − F) −2 4NYPNYQ54TOTOQ5c B/2d( +  F)(− − F)e   
